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1. Why Worry about Uncertainty?
This paper was motivated by the fact that the methods employed by in-
flation targeters to deal with uncertainty do not receive as much attention
as other parts of the inflation targeting strategy. This insufficient attention
does not correspond to the impact that these methods, or a lack of them,
can have on the quality of decisions about interest rates. There are two es-
sential reasons why inflation targeters need a well-designed methodology
for dealing with uncertainty. Firstly, inflation targeting is a forward-look-
ing strategy. Prior to setting interest rates, monetary policy makers need
the best possible inflation forecast, given the constraints of imperfect know-
ledge about the current state of the economy and even less perfect know-
ledge about future economic events. Improper dealing with uncertainty can
lead to defects in the decision-making process, and, as a result, sub-optimal
policy reactions can burden the economy with otherwise avoidable costs, for
example an excessive output loss.1 Secondly, a well thought out methodo-
logy for dealing with uncertainty is easily explained to the general public.
Any ad hoc or implicit treatment of uncertainty necessarily leads to confu-
sion on the part of the financial markets and the public, who have difficul-
ties understanding why a certain decision about interest rates was taken.
This confusion can prevent the financial markets from deriving correctly
the future direction of monetary policy from the inflation forecast, and
the general public from distinguishing the consequences of unforeseen ex-
ternal shocks from policy errors. The subsequent loss of monetary policy
credibility can be costly for the economy.2
It is not easy to develop a well-designed methodology for dealing with un-
certainty and to communicate it effectively to the general public, since
the complete treatment of uncertainty is a very complex issue. Research pa-
pers often describe inflation targeting as inflation-forecast targeting, where
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the targeted inflation forecast is fully based on a model and normally dis-
tributed shocks.3 Although recent research has made significant progress
by approximating monetary policy decisions with Bayesian models that
work with more complex distributions and with robust control methods re-
lated to model uncertainty,4 the research papers still cover only a subset of
the uncertainties faced by monetary policy makers. Monetary policy makers
claim that they do not follow simplistic normative recommendations pro-
duced by models5 and emphasise that economic research should focus on
a much broader set of uncertainties. Interestingly, the economic research
itself provides enough evidence that monetary policy makers consider more
factors than the model-based forecasts and the above-mentioned subset of
uncertainties. Otherwise, it would not be so difficult to explain their deci-
sions with model simulations and policy rules.6 The missing part in the pic-
ture that the research papers draw is consideration of various types of so-
-called Knightian uncertainty.7 This type of uncertainty is not easily
approximated with a model or statistical distribution and can be related to
the forecasting model itself or to the expert judgement about unknown fac-
tors. Monetary policy makers are aware of the fact that forecasting the fu-
ture is very complicated, and, consequently, they employ a variety of me-
thods, not just model-based ones, to deal with uncertainty, however informal
or implicit this may be.8
The fact that the methodology for dealing with uncertainty is a very com-
plex issue implies that it is very difficult to describe fully. Hence, it is some-
times worked with implicitly during the decision-making process. While it
is easy to find papers describing a forecasting system of an inflation-tar-
geting central bank, it is much more difficult to find a systematic descrip-
tion of how inflation targeters deal with uncertainty. There are costs in-
volved if the methods employed by inflation targeters to deal with uncer-
tainty are not treated explicitly. First, inflation targeters cannot compare
notes about these methods as easily as they can about their forecasting mo-
3 Batini and Haldane (1999) and Svensson (1996) illustrate the features of inflation targeting
in this set-up.
4 Cogley, Morozov and Sargent (2003) and Sims (2002) draw a parallel between the behaviour
of monetary policy makers and Bayesian econometrics. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000) ap-
ply robust control methods to deal with model uncertainty. Cagliarini and Heath (2000) show
that in papers on robust control methods an inadequate decision rule is used. Similarly, Good-
hart (2003) suggests that minimising the costs of the worst possible scenario cannot approxi-
mate the behaviour of monetary policy makers. Both Cagliarini and Heath (2000) and Tetlow
and von zur Muehlen (2000) emphasise that the results of their analysis depend on the models
selected for the analysis.
5 Monetary policy makers also emphasise that it is not possible to use policy rules for norma-
tive recommendations. Issing (2002) points out that central banks must use frameworks that
are much more complex than policy rules.
6 Orphanides (1998), Smets (1999) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000) focus on explaining
the differences between the behaviour of monetary policy makers and the actions suggested by
policy rules by analysing the implications of different types of uncertainty.
7 This concept is defined in (Knight, 1921).
8 Blinder (1999), Freedman (1999) and Issing (1999) draw attention to the fact that the eco-
nomic research does not solve the problems of Knightian uncertainty, which is very difficult
to approximate with statistical distributions and is often related to the forecasting model it-
self.
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ployed and improved as effectively as they could. Second, central banks that
start targeting inflation may underestimate the importance of these meth-
ods. These are usually central banks in emerging economies, where the un-
certainties related to theinflation forecast are much larger than in advanced
market economies and where more attention should be paid to uncertainty,
not less. Third, monetary policy may not be fully transparent. This is es-
pecially a problem in periods when uncertainty plays a more prominent role
in decisions about interest rates than usual. A lack of transparency can re-
duce the efficiency of monetary policy actions. In addition, lower trans-
parency can mislead the economic research that analyses monetary policy
under uncertainty.9
These costs should be prevented by starting a discussion of the methods
dealing with uncertainty explicitly in the context of inflation targeting. As
was said, the methodology for dealing with uncertainty is usually very com-
plex, and hence a simple framework is needed to organize this discussion.
The aim of this paper is to suggest one comparative framework that might
do the job. The suggestion is to describe the methods available to deal with
uncertainty for each element of the interest rate decision-making process.
The suggested comparative framework is designed in line with the know-
-how of “decision analysis”. The concepts of decision analysis have been em-
ployed by decision-makers leading important institutions in many impor-
tant areas when they have needed to make good decisions under uncer-
tainty.10 According to decision analysis, every decision-making process con-
sists of certain elements that are all necessary for taking good decisions.
These elements present very different types of information, yet they must
still be put together in a consistent picture prior to the decision.
Examples of the above-mentioned elements include variant model-based
forecasts, the subjective probabilities of alternative scenarios and the pay-
-offs derived from loss functions. Like other decision-makers, monetary po-
licy makers employ them all in order to set interest rates. This does not
mean that all the elements are treated explicitly prior to every monetary
policy decision. It does mean, however, that all the elements have a signi-
ficant impact on the quality of the decision even if treated implicitly. The fol-
lowing example illustrates the importance of dealing with uncertainty ex-
plicitly. A “decision matrix” is used to demonstrate the example.
In the first case, the interest rate decision is based solely on the most
likely scenario (Table 1). One can think of it as follows. One set of assump-
tions was defined. The central forecast was produced with the core model,
working with a fixed-rate assumption. In addition, the model was used to
estimate the implications of two alternative policy reactions.11 The pay-off
of each outcome was then evaluated according to the policy maker’s loss
function. The policy reaction that yields the best pay-off, which is repre-
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9 One can observe from the recent debate – as outlined, for example, by Cagliarini and Heath
(2000) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2000) – that it is not easy for researchers to approxi-
mate the methods used by monetary policy makers to deal with uncertainty.
10 Beroggi (1998), Clemen (1996) and Skinner (1999) provide a good introduction to decision the-
ory and decision analysis.
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interest rates were left unchanged. In this case of no explicit dealing with
uncertainty, the decision matrix consists of one column only. It is analogous
to assuming that the model and all assumptions related to the forecast are
certain.
In the second case, the decision-making process consists of more elements
(Table 2), and consequently the decision matrix has more rows and columns.
Three alternative scenarios were considered and a probability was attached
to each of them. These probabilities are usually called subjective probabi-
lities, since they cannot be estimated easily. Theexpected pay-offs were com-
puted and the reaction with the best expected pay-off, which is represented
by the lowest value of the expected loss function, was selected. As a result,
interest rates were increased.
The comparison of thetwo above-described cases shows that methods deal-
ing with uncertainty are important for monetary policy makers in situa-
tions where the certainty equivalence principle does not hold.12 In the exam-
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Possible reactions
Reduction in interest rates 1.216
No change in interest rates 1.212*
Increase in interest rates 1.215
TABLE 1 One-Column Decision Matrix: “The Best of the Most Probable”
Notes: See (Smidkova, 2004) for calculations.
* This is the central forecast.
Probability 0.1 0.5 0.4
Alternative assumptions Deflation Neutral Inflation Expected
Possible reactions pressures pressures pressures pay-off
Reduction in interest rates 13.207 1.216 1.431 2.501
No change in interest rates 13.432 1.212* 1.300 2.469
Increase in interest rates 13.663 1.215 1.175 2.444
TABLE 2 Complex Decision Matrix: “The Best Expected Value”
Notes: See (Smidkova, 2004) for calculations.
* This is the central forecast.
11 It is worth noting that a similar approach can be used if the model includes endogenous mo-
netary policy. In that case, three different reaction functions can be used, representing neutral,
slow and aggressive responsiveness of monetary policy to shocks. Both approaches to inflation
forecasting are possible. Don (2001) argues that a conditional forecast is more suitable for in-
stitutions that can affect the whole economy and that an unconditional forecast causes a diffi-
cult decision problem for them. Archer (2003) claims that central banks should base their fore-
casts on models with endogenous monetary policy. The survey presented in (Smidkova, 2003)
shows that central banks use both approaches in reality.
12 In line with Brainard (1967), the certainty benchmark is defined as the policy reaction that
would be optimal under certainty. Under uncertainty, the optimal policy reaction is different.
According to the certainty equivalence principle, certain types of uncertainty, such as linear
symmetric risks, do not change the optimal policy. This is called the equivalence principle.
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bilities of the alternative sets of assumptions were significant and asym-
metric. Hence, once the uncertainty related to the central forecast was put
into the picture, a different decision was taken which was closer to opti-
mum than in the case of neglecting uncertainty. The example illustrates
the importance of treating uncertainty explicitly. Imagine that only the cen-
tral forecast was published in the second case. Without knowing the alter-
native sets of assumptions and subjective probabilities, observers most pro-
bably did not understand why interest rates were increased.
It follows that the suggested framework for comparing the methods em-
ployed to deal with uncertainty is general enough to encompass methods
that can differ quite substantially. They range from producing simulations
with the core forecasting model to attaching subjective probabilities to al-
ternative sets of assumptions to computing pay-offs from often implicit loss
functions. It is worth noting that although it looked quite simple in theexam-
ple, the information represented by the various components of the decision
matrix is not always easily obtained. Specifically, it is not straightforward
at all to define the alternative sets of assumptions. Although there are
model-based methods available to help with this task, such as sensitivity
analysis, at the end of the day the definition of alternative sets of assump-
tions relies enormously on the intuition and judgement of experts and mo-
netary policy makers.
2. The Methods Available to Deal with Uncertainty
The main purpose of this section is to present in a comprehensible way
the findings of a survey of the methods available to monetary policy makers
for dealing with uncertainty.13 Three distinct sources have been surveyed.
First, economic research on monetary policy under uncertainty provides
a background for dealing with certain types of uncertainties that can be in-
corporated into the model framework.14 Second, decision analysis offers va-
rious methods that are less mathematically rigorous and rely more on in-
tuition and judgement.15 Some forecasters have already used the decision
theory framework to recommend methods of presenting the forecast un-
certainty to decision makers.16 Third, the “real-life” methods of five infla-
tion targeters show that monetary policy makers do not limit themselves
to producing the central forecast when deciding about interest rates. They
typically rely on a combination of various methods to deal with uncertain-
ty. For example, several central banks attach subjective distributions to
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13 The background to the survey is described in (Smidkova, 2003).
14 Cogley, Morozov and Sargent (2003), Sims (2001) and Wallis (2004) offer sophisticated econo-
metric tools to deal with uncertainty that can be expressed within the model.
15 Clemen (1996), Skinner (1999) and Wright and Goodwin (1998) give examples of tools that
work with subjective probabilities, such as the decision matrix, the decision tree and the pay-
-off table.
16 Don (2001) uses decision theory terminology and argues that the role of the forecast is to help
reach competent decisions.
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ternative scenarios to deal with uncertainty about important external factors
such as commodity prices. And some let a group of experts vote about the poli-
cy recommendation prior to the meeting of the monetary policy makers.
The methods compiled from the survey have been grouped together into
the following four sections corresponding to elements of the interest rate
decision-making process:
– producing the central forecast by the expert group,17
– conducting robustness analysis18 by the expert group,
– attaching subjective probabilities and pay-offs by the expert group,
– deciding about interest rates by monetary policy makers.
It is worth noting that the interest rate decision-making process need not
be organized in the same order. Central banks often design their decision-
-making process as iterative. Some parts of the decision-making process can
even be repeated several times.19 These iterations usually aim at modify-
ing the assumptions of the central forecast in order to better reflect the sce-
nario with the best expected outcome. Without these iterations, the central
forecast could not play a prominent role in the actual decision and in ex-
ternal communication. Asymmetric risks attached to the central forecast
are one possible reason for initiating changes in the assumptions of the cen-
tral forecast.20 Since producing the central forecast with balanced risks
through an iterative process is a time-consuming process, the full forecast-
ing rounds are typically less frequent than the actual monetary policy de-
cisions. As a result, some methods for dealing with uncertainty, such as at-
taching subjective probabilities, can play a more prominent role between
the two forecasting rounds.
2.1 Producing the Central Forecast
The main purpose of producing the central forecast is to create a bench-
mark for the monetary policy debate. The central forecast is typically pro-
duced with one of the following three tools: expert know-how, a determi-
nistic model or a stochastic model. The more sophisticated the forecasting
tool is, the broader the set of technical methods dealing with uncertainty
can be employed (Table 3). First, all the tools allow for the compilation of
a list of uncertainties related to the central forecast. The list usually con-
sists of uncertainties that have alarge impact on theforecast and also ahigh
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17 Monetary policy makers often participate in the meetings of the expert groups.
18 Rosenhead and Mingers (2001) use a robustness matrix in order to organise the results of
the robustness analysis. Sometimes the two terms are viewed as interchangeable.
19 All five inflation targeters from the survey report strategies that are similar to the iterative
strategy. For example, the Swedish Riksbank describes its decision-making process as follows.
The main scenario and risks are mostly prepared by experts. If the Board disagrees with the out-
come of the process, the main scenario or inflation forecast distribution can be adjusted.
20 Monetary policy makers emphasise that asymmetry in risks poses a serious problem to them
because the central forecast is then too far from the best expected outcome. They may try to re-
duce the potential asymmetry in risks during the monetary decision-making process. The au-
thor thanks C. Goodhart and L. Niedermayer for this comment.
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licy simulations, reflecting thesensitivity of theinflation forecast to thelevel
of interest rates or to the specification of the reaction function, can be re-
ported. Third, within the stochastic model framework, estimates of the un-
certainties that can be represented within the core model are available to-
gether with the central forecast.
All methods aim at enlarging (and organizing) a supplementary set of in-
formation that is produced together with the central forecast. This stage is
crucial, since the larger the set of supplementary information is, the more
methods for dealing with uncertainty can be employed in the later stages
of the process.
2.2 Conducting Robustness Analysis
This part of the decision-making process is designed to detect the scope
of uncertainty related to the central forecast. By conducting robustness ana-
lysis, experts produce information that corresponds to elements of the so-
-called robustness matrix that is very similar to the matrix from the exam-
ple in section 1 (Table 2). By defining alternative policy assumptions, they
specify the rows of the matrix. By selecting the alternative sets of assump-
tions, they specify the columns of the matrix. By producing alternative fore-
casts for different rows and columns of the matrix, the experts obtain a full
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Examples CMS, HSYB, KW BoC, RBNZ, SR, BoE,  CNB* (prior to 2002)
CNB* (since 2002)
Full information set avail- 
Model gives framework
Robust to the core model
able for the next stages.
for discussion.
uncertainty. Major pros









Central forecast does not set makes it difficult to
Explicitly represented
necessarily indicate assess uncertainty in
Major cons
uncertainties may interfere
the optimal policy response. the next stages.
with further methods for 
Requires know-how of Implicit treatment of model
dealing with uncertainty.
modeling. uncertainty makes further
policy debate difficult.
TABLE 3 – Producing the Central Forecast
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB – Czech National Bank, RBNZ – Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. CMS – Cogley, Morozov, Sargent (2003), HSYB – Hall, Salmon,
Yates, Batini (1999), KW – Wallis (2004).
* In this case, the method has not been applied to its full extent (explanation given in brackets).
– past values 
of forecasting errors
– list of potential 
uncertainties produced
– estimation statistics 
(if model was estimated)
– sensitivity analysis
– interval forecast available
– past values 
of forecasting errors
– list of potential 
uncertainties produced
– sensitivity analysis;
– estimation statistics 
(if model was estimated)
– experts report past 
values of forecasting 
errors
– list of potential 
uncertainties produced
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tral forecast, the uncertainty faced by monetary policy makers is low. If they
differ significantly, great care must be taken to make a good decision. It is
often the case that the construction of the robustness matrix is done only
informally and the conclusion about low uncertainty is reached without ac-
tually running the model several times.
The most difficult step is the compilation of the list of relevant uncer-
tainties and the definition of the alternative sets of assumptions that form
the columns of the matrix. As was mentioned, the more information is avail-
able from the previous stage of the process, the better. The tricky part is to
select which uncertainties are relevant to the decision about interest rates.
Recent economic research suggests that building all the relevant uncer-
tainties inside the modeling framework and producing a stochastic distri-
bution of all the possible outcomes instead of a more simplistic robust-
ness matrix can be an option. However, the research does not so far offer
a methodology for incorporating all the potential uncertainties into one
framework.21 Moreover, this approach can lead to problems with overstated
uncertainty. Hence, experts cannot rely solely on the methods developed so
far by the economic research and they have to specify their list of relevant
uncertainties by using less formal approaches.
Which methods are available to select relevant uncertainties? According
to our survey, there are various options on hand. For example, it is possi-
ble to develop arule of thumb. Every potential uncertainty that could change
the inflation forecast by x % or more could automatically qualify for the list
of relevant uncertainties. Alternatively, it is possible to rely on intuition and
to illustrate several economic problems that are currently being debated
(even in this case, a relevant uncertainty should have a large potential im-
pact on the inflation forecast and have non-negligible probability).22 The fol-
lowing examples illustrate the potential candidates for the list of relevant
uncertainties:
– assumptions about an influential exogenous variable whose future path
is uncertain,
– residuals in an equation that is influential in the model and has large er-
rors,
– a functional form of an influential equation that is subject to a structural
break,
– the role of an influential equation that is over-written by off-model infor-
mation,
– influential model components (e.g. a long-run solution) that are not con-
sensual.
Once the list of relevant uncertainties has been compiled, experts face
the second dilemma of how to group them together into several sets of al-
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21 Issing (2002) gives examples of the problems faced by monetary policy makers that cannot be
dealt with using the currently available modeling methods.
22 It is worth noting that the process of deciding which uncertainties are relevant should eli-
minate those that are not very likely and those that are not very influential. As aresult, theprob-
lem of low-probability large extreme events that is analysed in Svensson (2003) should be eli-
minated.
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formal) robustness matrix has and also what the role of the central forecast
is in the decision-making process. There is an obvious trade-off. On the one
hand, a large number of sets is easy to generate, since each uncertainty can
be treated separately, but this is more difficult to discuss. On theother hand,
a small number of sets fosters an efficient policy debate, but is more diffi-
cult to construct since it requires quite a substantial debate about the suit-
able grouping. Due to this trade-off, inflation targeters, like other forecast-
ing institutions, use between two and five alternative scenarios, preferring
clearly a more efficient debate.23 It is worth noting that inflation targeters
use alternative sets even when they use probability distributions for re-
presenting uncertainty, because these distributions are constructed mainly
in order to communicate uncertainty externally.
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KW*, CMS* (in these 
two studies, off-model 
uncertainty is not 
FD, BoC, CNB* (quarterly),
Examples considered), SR* (interval 
RBNZ (“hawkish” and  CNB* (between
uncertainties specified 
“dovish” sets in the initial quarterly forecasts)
for inputs to the inflation 
stage)
forecast), BoE, SR*




No need to run
Major pros into sets.
Can approximate very
the model several










Difficult to use for external
the best expected




TABLE 4 Computing Alternative Outcomes
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB – Czech National Bank, RBNZ – Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. CMS – Cogley, Morozov, Sargent (2003), FD – Don (2001),
HSYB – Hall, Salmon, Yates, Batini (1999), KW – Wallis (2004).
* In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).
– produces a distribution
showing the second 
and third moments of
the estimated uncertainty
of the forecast
– several alternative 
outcomes approximate
the scope of uncertainty
related to the central 
forecast
– the distribution 
of the outcomes with 
respect to the central 
forecast approximates
the asymmetry of risks
– verbal description 
of risks related to
the central forecast 
indicate which types 
of uncertainty are 
relevant to the decision
23 Don (2001) also recommends a small number of scenarios in his paper about forecasting.
s_316_332  5.8.2005  15:30  Stránka 3242.3 Subjective Probabilities and Pay-offs
Subjective probabilities and pay-offs are supplementary information that
experts can provide to monetary policy makers in addition to robustness
analysis. They are both important if experts are asked to recommend which
policy decision to take. Without probabilities and pay-offs, it is not possible
to evaluate which decision corresponds to the best expected outcome. Some-
times, when producing a forecast or conducting robustness analysis with
a certain modeling framework, experts incorporate their views on pay-offs
and probabilities inside the framework. Specifically, models with endoge-
nous monetary policy or frameworks designed to produce fan charts fall into
this category. Other modeling approaches do not require this, and if not re-
vealed explicitly, the expert views on pay-offs and probabilities are not
known to monetary policy makers at the time of their decision on interest
rates.
When revealing the pay-offs, experts take into account two tools that are
usually built into the inflation targeting strategy to deal with uncertainty:
an inflation target interval and a list of caveats.24 They need to decide if
the circumstances are right to evaluate the outcome with respect to the mid-
-point of the target or whether the situation calls for some special action
such as targeting the upper or lower band of the target. This decision is
usually not reached mechanically and cannot be incorporated inside
the model. Similarly, the probabilities of alternative sets of assumptions
cannot be easily estimated and hence they are decided intuitively. That is
why for these two problems the economic research cannot offer a complete
solution. However, there are methods available to deal with the issue
(Table 5). The experts can use some of the tools suggested by decision ana-
lysis. The most sophisticated tool offered by decision analysis to policy mak-
ers is to ask the expert group to reach a consensus. Alternatively, the ex-
perts can vote about the pay-offs and probabilities and their votes can then
be averaged. The easiest way – followed by several inflation targeters – is
to allow the experts to work with the pay-offs and probabilities implicitly
and vote on the policy recommendation. In this case, monetary policy mak-
ers have access to the voting pattern and they can learn gradually over time
about the subjective probabilities and pay-offs attached by the experts to
the alternative outcomes.
No matter which tool is employed, it is always important to select the ex-
pert group carefully in order to deal with uncertainty efficiently. The expert
group should have both an adequate size and a well-designed structure.25
Specifically, the experts should not have the same background (e.g. it makes
no sense to have only the modeling team voting). In addition to the model-
ers, other experts in the group should be able to offer detailed knowledge
about problems that are on the list of relevant uncertainties. It follows that
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25 Clemen and Winkler (2004) show that adding an expert to the group as well as adding me-
thods improves the quality of decisions with diminishing returns, and that adding the expert
helps more than working with an additional analysis method. Blinder and Morgan (2000) show
that decisions about interest rates are better done by a group of experts.
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thumb that each alternative should be able to get at least two or three votes.
The composition of the group matters because the individual views are sub-
ject to biases.27 The most common mistakes when assessing subjective pro-
babilities are wishful thinking (the best outcome is attached the highest pro-
bability), experience bias (the alternative that was observed in the past is
attached the highest probability) and overconfidence (neglecting that sub-
jective probabilities can be wrong).
All the above-described tools employ methods to deal with these biases.
Specifically, averaging of the individual opinions across the heterogeneous
group of experts can be used in order to reduce biases. The averaging can
be done by the experts or by a monetary policy maker who listens in on their
debate. The latter method is sometimes referred to as the BOGSAT (bunch
of guys sitting around talking) method. Alternatively the expert group can
vote anonymously on a set of proposed subjective probabilities and then
the group must discuss the outcome of this initial voting and agree on con-
sensual probabilities. This method is called the Delphi method.28 It is pro-
bably the most efficient method for reducing the biases, but it can be very
time consuming. However, even simpler tools, such as averaging of the indi-
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Examples DA, BoE*, SR* (fan chart  DA CNB, BoC, RBNZ*
distribution is consensual) (BOGSAT)
All information available  All information available The easiest option – it
Major pros to monetary policy makers. to monetary policy makers. takes one short meeting
Biases in expert judgement  Biases in expert judgement to vote.
are detected and reduced. are reduced by averaging.
Time consuming  Differences between expert Policy makers have no
Major cons and sometimes  opinions are not  priors about pay-offs
frustrating. explained. and probabilities.
TABLE 5 Pay-offs and Probabilities Attached by Experts
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB – Czech National Bank, RBNZ – Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. DA – decision analysis
* In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).












– experts do not discuss
pay-offs or probabilities
but vote on policy 
recommendation
26 The comment that putting together the expert group is not an easy task has been made by
M. King. In the case of significant model uncertainty, researchers that have a deep knowledge
of alternative models can help. In the case of data uncertainty, statisticians that analyse spe-
cific data in a very detailed way can improve the discussion.
27 Clemen (1996) and Wright and Goodwin (1998) summarise possible biases that can affect
the specifications of subjective probabilities.
28 Armstrong (1985) explains the Delphi method, initially developed by the RAND Corporation
in 1969 for technological forecasting, in more detail.
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ases. It is worth noting that all these methods can be also employed by mo-
netary policy makers in the second stage of the decision-making process.
2.4 The Interest Rate Decision
When deciding about interest rates, monetary policy makers use all thein-
formation presented to them by the experts, all the additional information
they have, and their judgement and preferences in order to take the final
decision about interest rates.29 Their preferences better represent the pre-
ferences of society as a whole than do the preferences of the experts, owing
to the democratic nomination process that ensures this is the case. Since
they often have additional information, they can also have different views
on the subjective probabilities. This implies that monetary policy makers
can decide differently from the policy recommendation made by the experts.
When deciding about interest rates, monetary policy makers employ simi-
lar methods for dealing with uncertainty to those used by the experts when
they make decisions about the pay-offs and probabilities (Table 6).
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DA (Delphi), BoC, BoE*, 
SR* (in both cases, there   DA (heterogeneous
Examples is an iterative debate about  group of experts),  DA, RBNZ
the distribution around  CNB, BoE*, SR*
the central forecast)
Indirect revealing of  
pay-offs and probabilities 
Major pros to other decision makers  Fast Fast and transparent
and consensus are 
respected methods for 
dealing with uncertainty.
Time consuming; If voting pattern not
Transparency lower since announced, transparency No additional method for
Major cons pay-offs and probabilities  not so high. dealing with uncertainty
are not revealed. Outcome depends on  added
who is present.
TABLE 6 Interest Rate Decision
Note: Abbreviations: BoE – Bank of England, BoC – Bank of Canada, CNB – Czech National Bank, RBNZ – Reserve
Bank of New Zealand, SR – Swedish Riksbank. DA – decision analysis. CMS – Cogley, Morozov and Sargent
(2003), FD – Don (2001), HSYB – Hall, Salmon, Yates and Batini (1999), KW – Wallis (2004).
* In this case, the method has not been applied to the full extent (explanation given in brackets).
– Policy makers have 
different information than
experts.
– Policy makers use 
consensus method 
to avoid biases.
– Policy makers have 
different information than
experts.
– Policy makers use 
averaging method 
by voting.
– Governor has different
information than experts.
– Governor speaks with
advisors (BOGSAT).
29 The role of monetary policy makers has recently been analysed in Goodhart (2003), King
(2002), Lombardelli, Proudman and Talbot (2002) and Macklem (2002).
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as an important method for dealing with uncertainty, according to decision
analysis, although the voting is rarely mentioned among the methods that
inflation targeters claim to use for dealing with uncertainty. It is worth re-
membering that iterations, used to improve the forecast, can to some ex-
tent be a substitute for the consensus method. If several stages of the de-
cision-making process are repeated and the monetary policy makers are
part of the expert group, the central forecast can move closer to the best ex-
pected outcome.
There are trade-offs when designing the voting system of the decision-
-making body. Themore thevoting system helps in dealing with uncertainty,
the less transparent it is for external observers. Specifically, if the Go-
vernor decides about monetary policy interest rates himself, observers can
combine their knowledge of the published forecast with their guesses about
theGovernor’sloss function and subjective probabilities. Subsequently, they
can form their views about future policy actions more easily. If the decision-
-making body consists of several members who decide individually, exter-
nal observers can only make guesses about the aggregated loss function and
aggregated probabilities from the interest rate decision. If one member of
the decision-making body is absent from the policy meeting, the aggregate
loss function and the aggregate subjective probabilities that are behind
the final decision are likely to change. In this case, publishing the votes im-
proves the knowledge about the individual loss functions and subjective
probabilities, which are more stable than aggregates and hence easier to
predict. If the decision-making body makes consensual decisions, the indi-
vidual loss functions and subjective probabilities are very difficult for ex-
ternal observers to extract. In this case, some additional information, such
as an indication of the future policy bias, may be needed to improve exter-
nal communication.
3. Lessons to Be Learnt from the Survey
Inflation targeters use a broader variety of methods than it seems
at first sight. Although not all the methods are always worked with ex-
plicitly or described fully to the general public, inflation targeters do em-
ploy a broad variety of methods to deal with uncertainty when they set in-
terest rates. Their repertoire ranges from stochastic simulations to working
with subjective probabilities and pay-offs to considering the outcome of ex-
pert voting. In this respect, monetary policy makers are similar to decision
makers leading important institutions in other areas. This conclusion cor-
responds to the claims made often by monetary policy makers that their de-
cisions cannot be approximated with a model-based forecast or a model-
-based policy rule without substantial simplifications.
External communication does not explain all the methods syste-
matically. It comes as a surprise that the variety of methods employed by
inflation targeters is so large, because inflation targeters do not focus on
communicating their methodologies systematically. They often describe
the risks attached to the forecasts in order to communicate that the pro-
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The risks are described verbally or with the help of fan charts or alterna-
tive forecasts. Some inflation targeters also publish information about how
the individual policy makers voted. The policy recommendations of the ex-
perts and the subjective probabilities attached to the alternative sets of as-
sumptions or pay-offs are often treated implicitly. The implicit treatment
of some elements of the methodology may be one of the reasons why the re-
search still cannot approximate well how decisions about interest rates are
taken.
Inflation targeters can learn from each other. Inflation targeters do
not use the same methods to deal with uncertainty. Hence, they can com-
pare notes and learn from each other. For example, the final decision is ta-
ken differently: by reaching a consensus among the board members, by ite-
rative forecasting procedures, or by independent votes by individual
members or by just one decision-maker. One can also observe a large vari-
ety of methods when the alternative sets of assumptions are specified. They
are represented with the help of probability distributions, with variant fore-
casts (defined with respect to the central forecast) or with two boundary
sets of assumptions that help to open the policy debate. The research should
focus more on analyzing which methods yield better results. It is worth not-
ing that the components of the decision-making process that are discussed
externally more often are very similar in all five surveyed cases. Specifi-
cally, the central forecast is typically model-based and the model is used for
producing alternative forecasts and policy simulations.
Inflation targeters can learn from economic research. The survey
showed that inflation targeters have so far stayed in the middle ground as
far as forecasting tools are concerned, while research papers have moved
the technology frontier further. This is probably due to the fact that greater
sophistication is costly in terms of know-how and the time required for
the forecasting exercise, and even in terms of more complicated debate.
The example of the CNB indicates that inflation targeters in emerging
economies usually start with expert forecasts, and introduce fully model-
-based forecasts at a later stage. The economic research has recently offered
powerful methods for dealing with certain types of uncertainties inside
the model framework, such as Bayesian fan charts or the use of several
models in parallel to produce the forecast. These should be gradually in-
corporated into the methods employed by inflation targeters to deal with
uncertainty.
Inflation targeters can learn from decision analysis. While robust
control and Bayesian techniques can help with the initial stages of the de-
cision-making process, decision analysis can help improve the methods in
the latter stages. Intuition and judgement are not incorporated into the de-
cision-making process as formally as they are in thedecision-analysis frame-
work. Specifically, the experts often work with their subjective probabili-
ties and pay-offs implicitly. Decision analysis suggests that a well-designed
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attaching probabilities and pay-offs, can reduce biases substantially. More-
over, the experts’ know-how can be fully utilized only if revealed to the mo-
netary policy makers. For example, more attention should be paid to me-
thods of constructing subjective probabilities. Instead of voting on the policy
recommendation only, experts can systematically employ one of the earlier-
-mentioned methods, such as theDelphi method or averaging, to attach sub-
jective probabilities to alternative sets of assumptions.
Not all methods are employed with the same frequency. The full fore-
casting round, including complete robustness analysis, is a time-consum-
ing exercise, and, consequently, it is often the case that interest rates are
changed more frequently than the inflation forecast. This implies that some
of the methods for dealing with uncertainty are used more frequently than
the ones incorporated into the central forecast. For example, the methods
employed in order to attach subjective probabilities to alternative sets of
assumptions can be employed prior to each interest rate decision without
updating the alternative sets themselves. In extreme situations, monetary
policy makers can decide about interest rates after employing the methods
used during the actual decision meeting only. This may happen, for exam-
ple, during times of financial or exchange-rate turbulence, when monetary
policy makers can hold policy meetings very frequently and there is only
time for intuitive decisions.31
31 Smidkova et al. (1998) documents that policy meetings are very frequent in these circum-
stances.
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SUMMARY 
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How Inflation Targeters (Can) Deal 
with Uncertainty
Kateřina ŠMÍDKOVÁ – Czech National Bank, Prague (katerina.smidkova@cnb.cz)
The paper argues that a well-designed methodology for dealing with uncertainty
improves the quality of interest-rate decisions taken by inflation targeters. A well-
-planned methodology is also more easily communicated to the general public, and
the subsequent greater transparency makes inflation targeting more efficient.
Therefore, it is relevant for an inflation targeter to consult with or consider infor-
mation from other inflation targeters, researchers, and relevant decision makers
when designing or improving upon their methodology. The paper also summarizes
the results of a recent survey on methods for dealing with uncertainty for inflation
targeters. The results are presented in a framework designed in line with decision
analysis. The paper summarizes which methods are commonly used by inflation tar-
geters and what lessons can be learnt from economic research and from decision
makers.
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